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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code, section 78-22(3)(c), and Utah Constitution article VIII, section 4.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
There are two issues on appeal: whether the District Court erred in failing to
impose the sanction of disbarment against the Respondent, Peter M. Ennenga, for his
misappropriation of money from a client and other professional misconduct, and
whether the District Court gave undue weight to factors in mitigation of Ennenga's
misconduct.

These issues were preserved in the District Court through closing

argument and through the Sanctions Hearing Brief submitted to the court. [R. 411 at
106-124; 326-341]
Both of these issues are questions of law. On appeal, the Court may draw its
own inferences from the District Court's factual determinations, which are reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard. See In re Pendleton, 2000 UT 77, fl 20. While the
Court gives serious consideration to the District Court's rulings and factual findings, it
"'may make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline' if the
evidence warrants." See id. (quoting In re Knowlton, 800 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1990)).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Rule 6. Aggravation and Mitigation.
6.1. Generally.
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating
circumstances may be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to
impose.

6.2. Aggravating circumstances.
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. Aggravating
circumstances may include:
(a) prior record of discipline;
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
(d) multiple offenses;
(e) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally railing to
comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority;
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
practices during the disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct
involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary authority;
(h) vulnerability of victim;
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(j)
lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved; and
(k) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances.
6.3. Mitigating circumstances.
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify
a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. Mitigating circumstances
may include:
(a) absence of a prior record of discipline;
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems;
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved;
(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to
the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
(f) inexperience in the practice of law;
(g) good character or reputation;
(h) physical disability;
(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability;
and
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the
misconduct; and
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental
disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful
rehabilitation; and
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely;
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(j) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that
the respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay;
(k) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or
impairment;
(I) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(m) remorse; and
(n) remoteness of prior offenses.
6.4. Factors which are neither aggravating nor mitigating.
The following circumstances should not be considered as either
aggravating or mitigating:
(a) forced or compelled restitution;
(b) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(c) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
(d) complainants recommendation as to sanction; and
(e) failure of injured client to complain.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Nature of the Case, the Course of Proceedings, and Its Disposition in
the District Court
This is an attorney discipline matter.

The District Court suspended the

Respondent, Peter M. Ennenga, under circumstances in which he should have been
disbarred. The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") appeals the
District Court's decision, and respectfully urges this Court to reverse it, and instead to
enter an order of disbarment against Ennenga.
The OPC filed a Complaint against Ennenga in August 1997 and a First
Amended Complaint in September 1997. [R. 1-68; 145-165; 75-144] The District Court
granted partial summary judgment as to some counts of the OPC's complaint. [R. 268]
On January 11, 2000, the District Court presided over a trial to determine
whether Ennenga violated the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules"). [R. 309-314]
By means of a Memorandum Decision entered January 18, 2000, the court issued
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findings of fact on the basis of which it concluded that Ennenga violated the Rules. [R.
309-314]
Accordingly, the matter proceeded to a sanctions hearing on March 28, 2000.
[R. 364] After the sanctions hearing, the court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and entered an order sanctioning Ennenga by suspending him from the practice
of law for a period of six months. [R. 376-385; R. 389-392]
B.

Statement of the Facts
1.

Proceedings Before the OPC Filed Its Complaint in District Court

The OPC received informal complaints from several of Ennenga's clients, and
these are the bases for the disciplinary action against him. [R. 2-3; 146-148] In each
matter, the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar conducted Screening
Panel hearings, and voted to issue a formal complaint against Ennenga. [R. 2-3; 146148]

Specifically, Rodney Glover filed an informal complaint against Ennenga on

February 8, 1993, and the Screening Panel hearing was on October 19, 1993; Alice
Durrant-Funk filed one on April 2, 1993, and the Screening Panel heard it on October
19, 1993; Taner Yarbil filed one on April 13, 1995, and it was presented for a Screening
Panel hearing on February 1, 1996; and JoAnn Wilson filed one on May 30, 1996, and
the matter reached a Screening Panel hearing on January 30, 1997. [R. 2-3; 146-148]
The OPC initiated this attorney discipline action by filing a complaint against
Ennenga in District Court on August 6, 1997. [R. 1-68] The initial complaint included
allegations and counts arising from the Glover, Yarbil, and Wilson matters, but not the
Durrant-Funk matter.

[R. 1-68]

With Ennenga's consent, the OPC filed a First
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Amended Complaint on September 12, 1997, which included allegations and counts
arising from the Durrant-Funk matter. [R. 73-74; R. 145-165; 75-144]1
In August 1998, the OPC moved for Partial Summary Judgment as to some of
the counts of its First Amended Complaint [R. 172-174; 175-186] The District Court
granted summary judgment as to two counts that involved Ennenga's failure to respond
to the OPC's requests for information on four separate occasions in the Yarbii matter
and in the Durrant-Funk matter, in violation of Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules.

[R. 268-

269;159-160; 162]
2.

The District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Establish That Ennenga Committed Serious Professional Misconduct

Ennenga collected $18,000 on behalf of a client, JoAnn Wilson, who asked him
to hold the money in an interest-bearing trust account. [R. 309] Instead of putting the
money in trust, Ennenga deposited a portion into his checking account and retained the
balance in the form of a cashier's check. [R. 309-310] Ultimately, Ennenga spent all of
Wilson's money for personal purposes. [R. 310]

Although Wilson's accountant

requested an accounting and Wilson tried to contact Ennenga about the money, these
efforts were fruitless despite promises from Ennenga that he would pay Wilson the
money. [R. 310] Ennenga paid Wilson only after she had filed a complaint against him
with the OPC. [R. 310] Ennenga used his position as Wilson's attorney and fiduciary to

1

The index of the District Court record shows the Consent to Amend Complaint as
page numbers 73-144. This is inaccurate, inasmuch as the consent is merely two
pages long. Page numbers 75 through 144 are the exhibits, albeit out of their proper
alphabetical sequence, which were attached to the First Amended Complaint,
numbered pages 145 to 153 and 155 to 165. Pages 153 and 154 are a Notice of
Informal Complaint that the OPC believes should have been part of Exhibit "B" attached
to the First Amended Complaint; instead, they have been inserted in the middle of that
document.
5

obtain possession of her money. [R. 310] Ennenga breached his fiduciary duty and
converted Wilson's funds for his own use without her permission or knowledge. [R. 310]
Taner Yarbil retained Ennenga in June 1993 to represent him in a civil action. [R.
310] Although Ennenga filed a Complaint and served one of the two defendants, he
discontinued work on the case and did not inform Yarbil that he would no longer pursue
the matter. [R. 311]
The OPC requested information from Ennenga about the Wilson, Yarbil, and
Glover complaints, but Ennenga failed to timely respond to any of these requests. [R.
312]2
On the basis of the foregoing findings, the District Court concluded that Ennenga
violated the following Rules: Rule 1.4 (Communication), 1.15 (Safekeeping Property),
Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), Rule 8.4(b) (MisconductCommitting a Criminal Act That Reflects Adversely on the Lawyer's Honesty), and Rule
8.4(c) (Misconduct—Engaging in Conduct Involving Dishonesty). [R. 312] The Court
also found that "the statute of limitations bars the OPC's complaint against Ennenga on
the Glover matter."3 [R. 313]
3.

The Sanctions Hearing

The case proceeded to a sanctions hearing on March 28, 2000. [R. 376] The
District Court concluded that disbarment is the appropriate presumptive sanction for
Ennenga's misconduct. [R. 379]

Having identified the appropriate presumptive

2

The OPC had previously won summary judgment as to Ennenga's failure to
cooperate with regard to its investigation of the Durrant-Funk matter, as well as the
Yarbil matter. [R. 268-269; 159; 162]
3
The OPC does not appeal this ruling.
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sanction, the court analyzed the circumstances that may be considered and weighed in
deciding what ultimate sanction to impose. [R. 379-380]
The court made the following findings as to aggravating factors. Ennenga had
prior discipline, but its nature differed from his misconduct in the Wilson matter.4 [R.
380] Ennenga acted to benefit himself and his family. [R. 380] There was no pattern of
misconduct "excepting [Ennenga's] reluctance to participate in the disciplinary process
against him." [R. 380] There were multiple offenses, but from the court's perspective,
there was one serious offense and several minor offenses. [R. 380]

Ennenga

obstructed the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with rules or
orders of the disciplinary authority. [R. 380] "Mr. Ennenga has admitted the wrongful
nature of the misconduct, has explained his involvement completely, and expresses
sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the misconduct took place.

He,

however, did not openly admit any of these things until shortly before the trial." [R. 380381] Neither of the victims was particularly vulnerable, and "Ms. Wilson, in fact, made
the misconduct too easy." [R. 381] Ennenga practiced law for twenty-one years before
the date of the misappropriation. [R. 381] Ennenga made full restitution, "but did not do
so until he was under duress." [R. 381] "The only illegal conduct that occurred here
was the misappropriation of funds." [R. 381]
The District Court also made the following findings as to mitigating factors.
Ennenga suffered "personal and emotional problems as a result of his inability to meet
his regular financial obligations." [R. 381] Ennenga made full restitution to Wilson,
4

The OPC observes that although the previous misconduct did not involve
misappropriation of client funds, Ennenga testified that "in one of the cases I might have
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although it was "not particularly timely." [R. 381] Witnesses testified that Ennenga "was
a fine attorney with an outstanding reputation for honesty." [R. 382] "There was a
significant delay in this matter" that is "attributable as much or more to the OPC as it is
to Mr. Ennenga;" but Ennenga "has not demonstrated prejudice resulting from the
delay." [R. 382] The court found that there was interim reform, evidenced by the fact
that Ennenga has had no valid complaints filed against him for misconduct after 1992.
[R. 383] Ennenga "is very remorseful and has been since the 1992 misconduct." [R.
383]
The court found and concluded that "[t]he mitigating circumstances outweigh the
aggravating circumstances." [R. 383]

It further concluded that, "Weighing the

misconduct of Mr. Ennenga against the misconduct of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince
shows a significant difference in the seriousness of the conduct, both as to the number
of incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the time elapsed between misconduct and
sanction." [R. 383]
Based upon the foregoing findings and the conclusions it drew therefrom, the
District Court entered an order suspending Ennenga from the practice of law for a
period of six months, followed by a three-year period of supervision by "an experienced
attorney." [R. 389] The court also required Ennenga to "participate in psychological or
psychiatric counseling prior to practicing law again." [R. 390]
4.

The Delay In the Proceedings

Nearly four years elapsed between Ennenga's misappropriation of Wilson's
money and Wilson's filing an informal complaint with the OPC. [R. 410 at 4; 2-3; 146-

misled the clients into thinking that I was going to do something that I wasn't at that
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148]

Wilson testified that she asked Ennenga to put into an escrow account the

$18,000 he collected on her behalf. [R. 410 at 4-5] Although she was unsuccessful in
getting Ennenga to give the money to her, she assumed this had to do with reasons
other than the truth of the matter: that Ennenga had misappropriated it. [R. 410 at 5-9]
Wilson did not learn what became of the $18,000 until her informal complaint had been
heard by the Screening Panel. [R. 410 at 9-11] Indeed, in response to a question
about whether she asked Ennenga where the funds were, she testified, "No, I didn't
ever question where the funds were[.] I had told him to put them in an escrow account."
[R. 410 at 19] Thus, Wilson did not realize that Ennenga had misappropriated her
money until after she had complained to the OPC.
The District Court's findings establish that Ennenga obfuscated the status of the
money: Wilson's accountant requested an accounting, Wilson tried to contact him about
it, Ennenga promised he would pay her. [R. 310] Ennenga's testimony on this point
included the following: "I never told JoAnn Wilson's [sic] Wilson that I had used her
money. At the same time, I never told JoAnn Wilson that she would never get her
money, that her money somehow had vanished. I basically used the language to keep
her in suspense about what was happening with her money." [R. 411 at 89] He added
that he responded to Wilson's requests "[o]nly when cornered . . . ." [R. 411 at 90]
Ennenga also agreed that "it's fair to say" that the things he told Wilson kept her on
hold. [R.411 at 101]
Wilson filed her complaint on May 30, 1996.

[R. 2-3; 146-148]

The case

proceeded to a Screening Panel hearing on January 30, 1997. [R. 2-3] The Complaint

point in time prepared to do." [R. 411 at 17]
9

was filed approximately six months later, during which time the OPC met with Ennenga
and there were discussions with his counsel. [R. 411 at 103-105]
Although there was no further on-the-record activity in the court case until August
1998, the OPC made a couple of overtures to settle the case predicated upon the newly
announced decisions of this Court in the Babilis and I nee matters. [R. 411 at 105; 135136] As counsel explained to the District Court, the OPC hoped that these decisions
would assist it in resolving the Ennenga matter without the necessity of taking it to trial.
[R.411 at 135-136]
Settlement efforts failed, however, and the OPC filed its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, and served discovery requests on Ennenga in the form of
interrogatories and requests for production of documents. [R. 187-188] When the time
for answering those requests expired without a response, the OPC requested
Ennenga's cooperation, and warned it would seek an order compelling him to respond.
[R. 219; 225] Thereafter, the OPC agreed to extend the time for response pending the
District Court's ruling on the OPC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. [R. 219;
226] Approximately one month later, the OPC asked Ennenga to proceed. [R. 219;
226] When Ennenga again failed to answer the requests, the OPC telephoned his
counsel, who again requested an enlargement of time. [R. 219] The OPC acquiesced,
but cautioned it would seek an order compelling responses if they were not forthcoming.
[R. 219-220] Still, Ennenga failed to respond to the discovery requests, and in January
1999, the OPC was forced to ask the District Court for assistance, which it granted in an
Order Compelling Discovery entered February 26, 1999.
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[R. 218-230; 240-241]

Ennenga did not serve answers to the OPC's discovery requests until March 23, 1999.5
[R. 245]
In addition to impeding the progress of discovery, Ennenga made no effort to
hasten the pace of the litigation. His testimony acknowledged that neither he nor his
attorney initiated any effort to move the case forward. [R. 411 at 8] Ennenga was not
aware of any efforts by his counsel to expedite the case, and he never requested an
expedited hearing. [R. 411 at 8]
5.

Ennenga Concealed His Misconduct From His Colleagues, Clients,
and His Ecclesiastical Leader and Told His Wife About It Only When
Paying Restitution Became an Issue

Thomas Lowe, was Ennenga's partner during the time Ennenga misappropriated
Wilson's money. [R. 411 at 36-38] Lowe testified that by taking Wilson's money and
placing it in his own account instead of the firm trust account, Ennenga violated firm
policy. [R. 411 at 37-38] Lowe agreed that in doing so, Ennenga deceived him and the
other partners of the firm. [R. 411 at 38] Moreover, Ennenga concealed his actions
from Lowe for a number of years: Lowe first learned of the Wilson situation when the
firm received a letter from her attorney. [R. 411 at 38-39]
Ennenga's long-time friend and client, Kent Chard, testified that he had only
known for a few days before trial of Ennenga's misconduct. [R. 411 at 55, 60]
Ennenga's ecclesiastical leader, Scott Williams, testified that Ennenga was
remorseful, but Williams had only known about the Wilson matter for one week prior to
the sanctions hearing. [R. 411 at 65-66]

5

Additionally, although the District Court ordered Ennenga to pay the OPC's
attorney's fees in connection with his failure to answer its discovery requests, Ennenga
did not pay the fees until nearly one year later. [R. 411 at 11-12]
11

Ennenga's wife, Nancy Ennenga, testified that she first learned of the Wilson
matter three years before trial (approximately four years after the misappropriation), "in
connection with paying the money back." [R. 411 at 81-82]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court's decision to suspend Ennenga, rather than disbar him, is
contrary

to

established

law:

Ennenga

misappropriation of a client's money.

should

have

been

disbarred

for

his

Moreover, the court's conclusions concerning

certain mitigating factors contravene the clear language of the Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Discipline ("Standards") and the guidance given by this Court in recent attorney
discipline decisions.

Because of their significant role in the analysis of the District

Court's error in imposing the sanction of suspension in lieu of the appropriate
presumptive sanction of disbarment, the OPC will first address the court's errors in
identifying and weighing mitigating factors.
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred in Its Analysis of the Mitigating Factors
The District Court identified as mitigating circumstances several factors that

either do not meet the criteria set forth in the Standards or are inconsistent with this
Court's guidance as to how they should be weighed. Although it is difficult to know how
much weight the court placed on each of the factors it identified, its conclusion was that
M

[t]he mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances." [R. 383] The

court added that "[w]eighing the misconduct of Mr. Ennenga against the misconduct of
Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a significant difference in the seriousness of the
conduct, both as to the number of incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the time
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elapsed between misconduct and sanction."

[R. 383]

Thus, although there were

numerous significant aggravating factors,6 including dishonest or selfish motive,
obstruction of the disciplinary process, substantial experience in the practice of law,
failure to make restitution until under duress, and illegal conduct in the form of
misappropriation, the District Court nevertheless concluded that the mitigating factors
were so substantial as to warrant departure from the presumptive sanction of
disbarment. This was error.
A.

The District Court Erred in Concluding That Ennenga's Personal
Problems Resulting From Financial Problems Constitute a Mitigating
Circumstance

The District Court found that Ennenga misappropriated Wilson's money because
of a history of poor business practices that resulted in financial problems so severe he
could not make mortgage payments in a timely fashion. [R. 378] Ennenga used the
money he misappropriated from Wilson to prevent foreclosure on his house. [R. 377378]

The District Court concluded that "Mr. Ennenga was suffering personal and

emotional problems as a result of his inability to meet his regular financial obligations."
[R. 381] The court's statement that "[w]eighing the misconduct of Mr. Ennenga against
the misconduct of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a significant difference in the
seriousness of the conduct, both as to the number of incidents, the motive of the
attorney, and the time elapsed between misconduct and sanction^" suggests it

6

The District Court found that Ennenga has a prior record of discipline, which is
identified as an aggravating factor, "but not of the same nature as the Wilson
misconduct." [R. 380] Under its analysis of the mitigating circumstances, which include
"[a]bsence of a prior record of discipline," the court found that "there is a prior record of
discipline, but less significant tha[n] 8.4 and not of the same sort of misconduct." [R.
381] The court thus appears to have noted Ennenga's prior record of discipline as an
aggravating circumstance, but assigned it little weight.
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accorded this factor substantial weight in deciding to diverge from the presumptive
sanction of disbarment. [R. 383 (emphasis added)]
The Standards indeed identify as a mitigating circumstance "[p]ersonal or
emotional problems."

Rule 6.3(c), Standards. An attorney's financial problems are

entitled to little weight, however, as a mitigating circumstance. See In re Ince, 957 P.2d
1233, 1237-1238 (Utah 1998) (Ince's numerous health and financial problems did not
mitigate theft of firm and client money); see also Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Krasnoff,
488 So.2d 1002, 1006-1007 (La. 1986) (attorney's personal adversity does not greatly
mitigate disciplinary violations). The New Jersey Supreme Court put it thus:
It makes no difference whether the money is used for a good purpose or a
bad purpose, for the benefit of the lawyer or for the benefit of others, or
whether the lawyer intended to return the money when he took it, or
whether in fact he ultimately did reimburse the client; nor does it matter
that the pressures on the lawyer to take the money were great or minimal.
The essence of [In re Wilson] is that the relative moral quality of the act,
measured by these many circumstances that surround both it and the
attorney's state of mind, is irrelevant: it is the mere act of taking your
clients money knowing that you have no authority to do so that requires
disbmarment
The misuse of clients' money as a matter of convenience to defray
personal expenses such as for a vacation and a party, does not
ameliorate the ethical misconduct. Family financial pressures cannot
excuse an attorney's ethical dereliction.
In re Blumenstyk, 704 A.2d 1,12 (N.J. 1997) (emphasis added; citations omitted).
The root cause of Ennenga's personal problems was his failure to live within his
means, and his willingness to finance his mortgage to the detriment of his client. The
District Court's conclusion on this point is a signal to lawyers that their financial
problems are sufficient justification to overcome severe sanction for their misconduct,
and it is error because it is contrary to the direction given by this Court in Ince.
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B.

The District Court Erred in Concluding That Ennenga's Compelled
Restitution Is a Mitigating Circumstance

The Standards identify as a mitigating circumstance "timely, good faith effort to
make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved." Rule
6.3(d), Standards. The District Court found that Ennenga "only repaid [Wilson] in 1997
after her informal complaint against him was filed in 1996 and she had also retained an
attorney to take action against Mr. Ennenga for the money."

[R. 378]

Ennenga

eventually paid Wilson the principal, plus interest and attorney's fees. [R. 378-379] The
court additionally found that "Mr. Ennenga's effort was not particularly timely, but he did
completely rectify the consequences to Ms. Wilson." [R. 381]
The District Court did not mention this factor when it compared Ennenga's
misconduct with that of the attorneys in previous discipline cases, so perhaps this was
not a significant component of its decision to suspend rather than disbar Ennenga.
Because the point is ambiguous, however, the OPC is compelled to address it.
The Standards require both that the restitution be made and that it be timely if it
is to constitute mitigation. Here, restitution was made, but it was not timely, and there is
unambiguous precedent from this Court to the effect that restitution made after an
attorney's misconduct has been detected does not qualify as a mitigating factor. In
Ince, the Court explained why:
After an attorney's misconduct is discovered, restitution can be
characterized simply as the 'honesty of compulsion' and may be evidence
only of the lawyer's ability to raise the money or desire to avoid being
disbarred rather than of a sincere desire to rectify the wrongdoing.
In re Ince, 957 P.2d at 1238; see also Rule 6.4(a), Standards ("Forced or compelled
restitution" is a circumstance that "should not be considered as either aggravating or
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mitigating."); Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Gridley, 545 N.W.2d 737, 740 (Nebr. 1996)
("The fact that no client suffered any financial loss is no excuse for a lawyer to
misappropriate clients' funds nor any reason why a lawyer should not receive a severe
sanction.").
The Supreme Court of New Jersey discussed it as follows: "The restitution of
misappropriated funds does not alter or obscure the fact that when restitution is used to
support the contention that the lawyer intended to 'borrow' rather than steal, it simply
cloaks the mistaken premise that the unauthorized use of clients' funds is excusable
when accompanied by an intent to return them. The act is no less a crime. Lawyers
who 'borrow' may, it is true, be less culpable than those who had no intent to repay, but
the difference is negligible in this connection." In re Blumenstyk, 704 A.2d 1, 10-11
(N.J. 1997)
Because Ennenga did not attempt to ameliorate his wrongdoing until long after
he was caught and confronted, and indeed only after Wilson reported it to the OPC and
hired counsel to take action against him, restitution is entitled to no weight in mitigation
of his misconduct.
C.

The District Court Erred in Concluding That Delay in the Disciplinary
Proceedings Constituted a Mitigating Circumstance

The Standards identify as a mitigating circumstance "unreasonable delay in
disciplinary proceedings, provided that the respondent did not substantially contribute to
the delay and provided further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting
from the delay." Standards, Rule 6.3(j). The District Court found as follows:
There was a significant delay in this matter. While Ms. Wilson did not file
her complaint against respondent until 1996, other complaints with respect
to other matters referred to above were filed in 1993. The OPC has been
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conducting an investigation into this matter since 1993, and only filed its
Complaint in August of 1997, and its First Amended Complaint in
September of 1997. 7 Mr. Ennenga certainly didn't facilitate moving the
case forward on a faster track in his refusal to provide information to the
Bar through the discovery process, but the delay is attributable as much or
more to the OPC as it is to Mr. Ennenga. Mr. Ennenga has not
demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay.

[R. 382]
As a threshold matter, the OPC observes that the District Court did not find that
the delay was unreasonable. [R. 382] Nevertheless, the court appears to have given
this factor considerable weight as a mitigating circumstance, for it subsequently
concluded that "[w]eighing the misconduct of Mr. Ennenga against the misconduct of
Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a significant difference in the seriousness of the
conduct, both as to the number of incidents, the motive of the attorney, and time
elapsed between misconduct and sanction.19 [R. 383]
The court's findings suggest it weighed the factors causing the delay and
concluded that Ennenga contributed to it less than the OPC. This is not the equivalent
of finding that Ennenga "did not substantially contribute to the delay."

Moreover,

Ennenga's failure to disclose to Wilson the status of her money delayed her discovery of
his misappropriation, and was surely a factor contributing to the four-year interval
between the misappropriation of Wilson's filing of her informal complaint. Counting the
delay in Ennenga's favor would reward his long-term concealment of his misconduct.

7

The most serious complaints against Ennenga were the Wilson matter and
Ennenga's repeated failure to cooperate with the OPC. The OPC filed its Complaint in
District Court within approximately six months of the Screening Panel hearing on the
Wilson matter, and the entire disciplinary case proceeded to trial in less than three
years.
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Even more significantly, however, the District Court explicitly found there was no
evidence of prejudice to Ennenga. Indeed, Ennenga's testimony acknowledged that the
delay worked to his benefit, insofar as it permitted him to continue practicing law. [R.
411 at 9] Additionally, he testified that, "The longer I didn't hear about this case the
better off I was. The more functional I was. I wasn't interested in being real proactive
with this." [R.411 at 96]
This Court considered whether a four-year delay in the disciplinary proceedings
should be treated as a mitigating factor in the Babilis case. Although the District Court
found that Babilis had been "'prejudiced to some degree by the delay in both ability to
recollect and the effect adverse publicity has had on him personally and on his
practice,'" the Court concluded the delay was not prejudicial. Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 217
(Utah 1997). The Court observed:
There are no facts indicating that Babilis opposed the delay or even
complained about it. Indeed, at least some of the delay was apparently for
his benefit so that he could resolve other pressing concerns. The
disciplinary court concluded that the cloud of disrepute engendered by bad
publicity on '[Respondent and his practice [was] not insubstantial.'
Nevertheless, Babilis was the person responsible for this, and it is difficult
to comprehend how the delay harmed his reputation; rather, it enabled
him to push back the day of judgment
Id. (emphasis added).
The delay in the proceedings permitted Ennenga to postpone accountability, and
as the District Court found, Ennenga failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the
delay. Under these circumstances, the court's conclusion that the delay is a mitigating
circumstance constitutes error.
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D.

The District Court Erred in Concluding That the Absence of
Complaints Against Ennenga Since the Time He Misappropriated
Wilson's Money Constitutes Interim Reform

The Standards identify as a mitigating circumstance "interim reform . . . ." Rule
6.3(k), Standards. The District Court found that "Mr. Ennenga has not had any valid
complaints filed against him regarding misconduct after 1992[]" apparently in support of
its conclusion that there was interim reform. [R. 383]
The OPC does not dispute the absence of further complaints against Ennenga,
but believes the District Court erred in concluding this constitutes interim reform in the
context of a misappropriation case. Interim reform might be meaningful as mitigation in
cases that do not involve an attorney's basic integrity and honesty.8 It has little value,
however, in mitigation of misconduct arising from theft of client funds and other acts
going to the attorney's fundamental lack of integrity.
E.

The District Court Erred in Concluding That Ennenga's EleventhHour Expressions of Remorse Constitute Remorse Within the
Meaning of the Standards

The Standards identify "remorse" as a mitigating circumstance. See Standards,
Rule 6.3(m). The District Court found that "Mr. Ennenga is very remorseful and has
been since the 1992 misconduct." [R. 383]

Elsewhere, the court found that "Mr.

Ennenga has admitted the wrongful nature of the misconduct, has explained his
involvement completely, and expresses sincere remorse and has been remorseful since
the misconduct took place. He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until
shortly before trial." [R. 380-381] Additionally, although Ennenga testified that he is
remorseful, he also stated, "I made a mistake, and now I keep having it thrown at me
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time after time. I think it [sic] about it often enough without it being thrown at me." [R.
411 at 96-97]
In the Ince case, this Court stated that Ince's "interim remorse and reform is not
compelling." Ince, 957 P.2d at 1238. The Court noted that although Ince's law firm
confronted him with evidence of misconduct, he "was not forthcoming." ki. at 1238.
Additionally, Ince admitted the misconduct "only when confronted with specific evidence
and was never completely willing to admit to undiscovered misconduct." ]d. The Court
concluded that, "[r]ather than seeming truly sorry for his conduct and admitting to it, Ince
seemed sorry only that he had been caught." ]d.
This Court also had occasion to consider remorse as a mitigating factor in the
Tanner decision, which stated, "Tanner's remorse at trial is irrelevant. Naturally, anyone
going through a trial for [stealing client money and forging documents] would feel
remorse after getting caught.

Instead, the remorse question closely relates to

acknowledgement of wrongful conduct: did Tanner feel remorse about his behavior
before getting caught, and was he motivated by remorse in making amends? . . . The
district court's ruling that Tanner failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his
conduct makes clear that Tanner was unmotivated by remorse until after discovery."
Tanner, 960 P.2d 399, 403 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted).
As these cases make clear, remorse is shown through honest and uncompelled
disclosure of the misconduct before it is discovered by others and an attempt to rectify
its consequences without being forced to do so. Ennenga's expressions of remorse at
trial simply do not qualify.
8

Ennenga had many opportunities to tell Wilson the true

For example, an attorney's interim reform might mitigate misconduct in the form
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status of her money, and yet he chose not to. Instead, he repeatedly assured her she
would receive it, then reneged on his promises. As the District Court found, "he stalled
her when she started requesting the funds by avoiding discussion of the funds'
whereabouts or the specific time that he would remit them to her. Mr. Ennenga testified
that he didn't want to lie to Ms. Wilson, but he didn't want to admit that he had taken the
funds and no longer had them either. . . . [H]e only repaid her in 1997 after her informal
complaint against him was filed in 1996 and she had also retained an attorney to take
action against Mr. Ennenga for the money." [R. 378] Thus, Ennenga never told her he
had stolen her money and used it for his own purposes, and didn't "come clean" until
after Wilson retained counsel to assist her in collecting it. Admitting his misconduct and
re-paying Wilson were not the acts of a remorseful person; they were the acts of
someone with no viable alternatives.
Likewise, Ennenga failed to disclose his conduct to those in whom a genuinely
remorseful person would confide:

his partner, his wife, his ecclesiastical leader.

Ennenga told his wife what he had done in connection with paying restitution. [R. 411 at
81-82] His former partner learned of it when the firm received a letter from Wilson's
counsel. [R. 411 at 38-39] His ecclesiastical leader learned of the misconduct only on
the eve of the sanctions hearing. [R. 411 at 65-66]
II.

The District Court Appears to Have Assigned Too Little Weight to the
Aggravating Factors
A.

Ennenga's Selfish Motive Is a Substantial Aggravating Circumstance

The District Court found that Ennenga had a selfish motive: "Mr. Ennenga's act
was to benefit himself and his family."

[R. 380]

Elsewhere, the court found that

of failure to diligently communicate with a client or prosecute cases.
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Ennenga misappropriated the money because his "history of poor business practices"
resulted in financial problems such that "he could not make his mortgage payments
when due." [R. 378]

The court nevertheless concluded that the mitigating

circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances and there was a "significant
difference in the seriousness of the conduct [as compared with that of Tanner, Stubbs,
Babilis, and Ince], both as to the number of incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the
time elapsed between misconduct and sanction." [R. 383 (emphasis added)].
With the exception of Stubbs, each of the respondents referred to by the court
was selfishly motivated to misappropriate money. Indeed, Ince was motivated to pay for
a house he could not afford. The District Court's conclusion that Ennenga's selfish
motive is entitled to little weight was error.
B.

The District Court Erred in According Little or No Weight to
Ennenga's Pattern of Misconduct, the Fact That He Committed
Multiple Offenses, and Obstructed the Disciplinary Proceedings

The Standards recognize "a pattern of misconduct" as an aggravating
circumstance. See Rule 6.2(c), Standards. The District Court "does not find a pattern of
misconduct in this matter, excepting [Ennenga's] reluctance to participate in the
disciplinary process.11 [R. 380 (emphasis added)]. The court thus appears to have
minimized "pattern of misconduct" as an aggravating circumstance, and there is no
mention of it when the court weighed the factors.
The

Standards

also

recognize

"[m]ultiple

offenses"

as

an

aggravating

circumstance. See Rule 6.2(d), Standards. With respect to this factor, the court found
that "[w]hile consideration of the rules violated would seem to indicate multiple offenses,
it is the trial court's perspective that there were minor offenses and one stand-alone

22

serious offense, namely the Wilson matter" [R. 380] The minor offenses to which the
court refers include Ennenga's repeated failure to cooperate with the OPC's
investigations of the complaints against him. [R. 312]
Finally, the Standards identify "[obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by
intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary authority." See
Rule 6.2(e), Standards. The District Court found that "Ennenga admits this." [R. 380]
Without discussing this factor, the court concluded that mitigating circumstances
outweighed the aggravating circumstances, and thus must not have accorded it
substantial weight. [R. 383]
The court's trivialization of Ennenga's repeated failure to cooperate with the
disciplinary proceedings is baffling, in light of its findings that (a) he violated Rule 8.1(b)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct; (b) "in three separate instances he failed to
provide information to the OPC through the normal discovery process in this case;" (c)
he "interfered with the pending disciplinary action against him;" and (d) he admitted that
he obstructed the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with the
rules or orders of the disciplinary authority." [R. 376-377, 379-380]
Ennenga's repeated failure to cooperate with the disciplinary proceedings is a
serious violation in and of itself. In this case, because the misappropriation of client
money warranted disbarment as the presumptive sanction, Ennenga's multiple
instances of failure to cooperate, which took many forms, and constituted the
obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings, should have weighed heavily in the balance
and vigorously argues against a downward departure from the presumptive sanction.
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C.

Ennenga's Failure to Openly Admit the Wrongful Nature of the
Misconduct Constitutes an Aggravating Circumstance

The

Standards

recognize

as

an

aggravating

circumstance

"refusal

to

acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, either to the client or to
the disciplinary authority." See Rule 6.2(g), Standards. The court found that Ennenga
"admitted the wrongful nature of the misconduct, has explained his involvement
completely, and expresses sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the
misconduct took place. He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until
shortly before trial" The District Court erred in failing to give this factor the weight it was
due: Ennenga's failure to openly admit his wrongdoing is, in essence, a refusal to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct.
D.

The District Court Erred in Finding That Wilson "Made the
Misconduct Too Easy"

The Standards identify as an aggravating factor "vulnerability of victim." See
Rule 6.2(h), Standards. The District Court found that "neither Mr. Yarbil nor Ms. Wilson
were particularly vulnerable." [R. 381] The OPC disagrees with this finding with respect
to Yarbil because he lives outside of this country, but does not appeal it. The error lies
in the court's next statement: "Ms. Wilson, in fact, made the misconduct too easy." [R.
381]
Wilson was Ennenga's client, and by virtue of their attorney-client relationship
was entitled to place in him the utmost trust and confidence. Wilson didn't ask Ennenga
where the money was because she believed she already knew: held in trust on her
behalf.

[R. 410 at 19]

Ennenga's misappropriation of Wilson's money cannot be

excused or explained by blaming her gullibility or complacence. The court's seemingly
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off-handed blame-the-victim comment is inappropriate, and to the extent that the
sentiment it expresses may have influenced the court's decision to impose a sanction
other than disbarment, was error.
E.

Ennenga Had Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law

The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor "substantial experience in the
practice of law." See Rule 6.2(i), Standards. The court found that Ennenga was in
practice "21 years to the date of the misappropriation of funds." [R. 381] The court did
not address the weight of its finding with respect to Ennenga's misappropriation of
Wilson's money, nor did it apply the aggravating circumstances to Ennenga's knowing
failure to cooperate with the OPC's investigation of his misconduct.
Although an attorney's length of time in practice has little to do with matters of
fundamental integrity and honesty,9 it has substantial implications for matters
concerning an attorney's knowledge of the law.

For example, an attorney's lack of

experience might in some circumstances mitigate misconduct in the form of
incompetence with respect to an area of practice.

Ennenga's twenty-one years in

practice substantially aggravates his failure to cooperate with the OPC's investigation.
He was, or should have been, well aware of his obligations and responsibilities in that
connection, and by virtue of his longstanding membership in the Bar, understands the
gravity of the reasons behind the rule requiring his cooperation. The District Court's
conclusion that this aggravating factor applied only to Ennenga's misappropriation of
Wilson's money was error.

9

See e ^ . In re Blumenstyk, 704 A.2d 1, 12 (N.J. 1997) ("a satisfactory or
distinguished career does not lessen the enormity of the knowing misappropriation of a
client's funds," and "seems less important to us where misappropriation is involved.").
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F.

Ennenga's Restitution Was Neither Timely Nor Made in Good Faith

The Standards identify as an aggravating circumstance "lack of good faith effort
to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved." See Rule
6.20), Standards. The District Court found that "Mr. Ennenga has made full restitution,
but did not do so until he was under duress." [R. 381] Although it appears the court
concluded this was an aggravating circumstance, its weight was undercut by the court's
finding as a mitigating circumstance that "Mr. Ennenga's effort was not particularly
timely, but he did completely rectify the consequences to Ms. Wilson!'

[R. 381

(emphasis added)]. The court thus found that Ennenga's restitution was not timely, and
it was made only under duress. This is not a good faith effort within the meaning of the
Standards, and is contrary to Rule 6.4's directive that forced restitution is neither an
aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance. See Rule 6.4, Standards.
G.

Misappropriation of Funds Is a Significant Instance of Illegal
Conduct, and Entitled to Substantial Weight

The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor "illegal conduct, including the
use of controlled substances." See Rule 6.2(k), Standards. The District Court found that
"[t]he only illegal conduct that occurred here was the misappropriation of funds." [R.
381] Thus, the court made the correct finding (i.e. that misappropriation is illegal), but
perhaps revealed its attitude towards the factor's significance when it used the word
"only" in describing misappropriation as a species of illegal conduct.
Even a single instance of illegal conduct, particularly something as serious as
misappropriation,10 is entitled to substantial weight in the balancing process in which a

Misappropriation constitutes illegal conduct under several sections of the
criminal code. See acj. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; Utah Code Ann. § 76-404.5.
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court must engage when determining whether a departure from the presumptive
sanction is warranted. The District Court's minimization of the significance of this factor
was error.
III.

The District Court's Decision to Suspend Ennenga Was Error
The case law interpreting the Standards is clear: absent truly extraordinary

mitigating circumstances, an attorney's theft of client money warrants disbarment. The
District Court's decision to suspend rather than disbar Ennenga is error and contrary to
established law in light of Ennenga's misappropriation of client funds and multiple
instances of failure to cooperate with the OPC's investigations, coupled with the
presence of several substantial aggravating circumstances and only minimal mitigation.
A.

Even a Single Instance of Misappropriation Can Warrant Disbarment

In attempting to distinguish Ennenga's case from that of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis,
and Ince, the District Court stated merely that Ennenga's misconduct "shows a
significant difference in the seriousness of the conduct, both as to the number of
incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the time elapsed between misconduct and
sanction." [R. 383] The court thus suggests that one of the significant differences
between Ennenga and the attorneys who have been disbarred in recent years is the
number of incidents involved.

Coupled with the court's statement that from its

perspective, the other offenses were minor and there was a single serious offense, it
appears the court considered Ennenga's single act of misappropriation insufficient to
warrant disbarment. This is error.

Of particular significance in an attorney/client context is the statute governing
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513(2).
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The OPC acknowledges that repeated instances of misconduct are more
egregious than single instances, and observes that the Standards take account of this
by identifying "a pattern of misconduct" and "multiple offenses" as aggravating
circumstances. Rule 6.2(c), (d), Standards. Thus, if a respondent violated the Rules,
the presumptive sanction might be increased if the misconduct is aggravated by the fact
that there is more than one instance and if the instance is of the same nature. The rules
do not, however, include a provision identifying "isolated incident" as a mitigating factor,
and this is as it should be, especially in matters involving an attorney's fundamental
integrity. The fact that an attorney stole money, but only stole money on one occasion,
neither diminishes the nature nor lessens the severity of the misconduct. The OPC
urges the Court to reject this as a factor that substantially distinguishes Ennenga's case
from recently reported attorney discipline cases.
Attorney discipline decisions from other jurisdictions are helpful in evaluating the
merit of recognizing "isolated incident" as a factor that can legitimately lessen the
severity of the sanction imposed.

For example, in a case in which the respondent

attorney converted client funds to his own use, the Supreme Court of Oregon disbarred
him notwithstanding the fact that the conversion was accomplished through a single act
of misconduct. See In re Pierson, 571 P.2d 907 (Or. 1977). The court noted its history
of disbarring lawyers who convert their clients' money, and acknowledged that cases
prior to Pierson involved more than one instance, whereas Pierson's conversion
involved a single instance. See id. at 909. The court nevertheless disbarred Pierson,
and stated as follows:
It is true that in each of those cases the lawyer was accused and found
guilty of more than one charge of misappropriation of funds, while the
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accused in the instant case is found guilty of only one conversion. We
have no reason to believe, however, that any member of the Bar of this
state has been led by those decisions to consider or presume that a single
instance of misappropriation of a client's funds will be tolerated. If a
member entertains such a conception, let his mind be hereby disabused
thereof. We hold that a single conversion by a lawyer to his own use of
his client's funds will result in permanent disbarment
]d. (emphasis added); see also In re Starks, 520 S.E.2d 687 (Ga. 1999) (single instance
of misappropriation, along with other types of misconduct, warranted disbarment); Foote
v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 517 So.2d 561 (Miss. 1987) (single instance of
misappropriation, along with other types of misconduct, warranted disbarment).
B.

The Standards and the Case Law Interpreting Their Application Make
It Absolutely Plain That Disbarment Is the Appropriate Ultimate
Sanction for Ennenga's Misconduct

As the Court has noted, "[t]o justify a departure from the presumptive level of
discipline set forth in the Standards, the aggravating and mitigating factors must be
significant." In re Ince, 957 P.2d at 1238. Moreover, when the weight of the mitigating
factors is at least balanced by the aggravating factors, no adjustment to the presumptive
discipline is warranted. See id.
In In re Babilis, the Court considered an attorney's conversion of client funds to
his own use and adopted as a general rule the principle that "intentional
misappropriation of client funds will result in disbarment unless the lawyer can
demonstrate truly compelling mitigating circumstances." In re Babilis, 951 P.2d at 217.
The case law developed since then in the Ince, Tanner, and Stubbs cases reinforces
the principle articulated in Babilis: fundamentally dishonest acts ordinarily will be
sanctioned with disbarment. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997); In re Ince,
957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998); In re Stubbs, 974 P.2d 296 (Utah 1999); In re Tanner, 960
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P.2d 399 (Utah 1998). Ennenga's case is not sufficiently different, nor are the mitigating
circumstances sufficiently compelling, to warrant a different outcome.
CONCLUSION
Disciplinary proceedings inquire into an attorney's fitness to practice, not merely
into whether the alleged misconduct occurred. Consequently, matters not arising from
the misconduct are relevant in aggravation or mitigation of the presumptive sanction.
Ideally, the District Court engages in a balanced consideration, guided by established
law, of the relevant factors, giving each its appropriate weight.

In the instant case,

however, the District Court gave undue weight to factors that, in reality, were not
particularly compelling and indeed were contrary to established law.
Viewed in context, Ennenga's restitution was coerced, his remorse evident only
after his misconduct was discovered, and he benefited from any delay in the
proceedings. Given this, the District Court erred in concluding that the evidence of
mitigation justified reducing the severity of the presumptive sanction.
The Standards and the recent case law interpreting those Standards are clear:
attorneys who steal money should be disbarred absent truly compelling mitigating
circumstances.

Under the circumstances of this case, which involved Ennenga's

misappropriation of client money and little compelling mitigation, the District Court's
decision to suspend Ennenga instead of sanctioning his misconduct with disbarment,
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was error. The OPC therefore respectfully requests the Court to reverse the order of
suspension, and to disbar Ennenga.
DATED:

October ,Q3 ,2000.

Kate A. Toomey
'
Deputy Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
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ADDENDUM
Memorandum Decision of January 18, 2000
Memorandum Decision of April 3, 2000
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Order: Suspension
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT

In the Matter of the Discipline
of:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 970905496

PETER M. ENNEN6A, #0999
Respondent.

At the conclusion of trial on January 11, 2000, the Court took
this matter under advisement and now issues its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The respondent is an attorney licensed to practice law in

the state of Utah since 1970.
2.

In approximately the spring of 1991 JoAnn Wilson retained

the respondent to collect various amounts owed her, including a sum
in the approximate amount of $18,000 owed to her business by Thomas
E. Soderberg.
3.

Respondent collected $18,000 from Thomas E. Soderberg on

or about May 21, 1992.
4.

On approximately May 26, 1992, Wilson requested that

Ennenga hold the $18,000 in an interest-bearing escrow account.
5.

Respondent never deposited said money in any trust or

escrow account, but in October of 1992 deposited a portion of
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several

and

attempt

respondent

- .

eiv.h- r faileo

t

espond

<. i

promised payment, which he failed to do.
,:

i" ,

Wilson

wi th L

filed

M^\7

^n

an

inf orma "1 romp I a i nt

aga I nst

r espc.)ndenl

1996.

10

Respondent did not pay Wilson her money until June of

11

Respondent used his position as Wilson's attorney

1997.

fiduciary to obtain possessior
12

Respondent

Wilson" i;, funds for *, 13.

• •*

of Wilson's money.
••

: r ar*y duty

and

converted

ithout ner permission or knowledge.

Taner Yarbil retained fespondent

contingency
14,

-

and

on 3 une 3, 19 93 on a

fee has i s 111 r aprf'senf hi i in i n a c:i v :i 1 actj oi i.

Respondent requested a retainer of $2,250 of which Yarbil

paid respondent $750.
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Respondent filed a Complaint on Yarbil1s behalf and

served one of two defendants in said case, but stopped any actions
to prosecute said case and failed to inform Yarbil that he was no
longer going to pursue the matter.
16.

Yarbil filed an informal Complaint with the OPC on April

15 1995.
17.

Beginning

in the late 1970's respondent represented

Rodney Glover in various matters, including part of a divorce
proceeding.
18.

Respondent's representation of Glover enabled him to

learn certain details regarding Glover's financial condition.
19.

On January 29, 1987 respondent obtained from Glover

$7,500 in the form of a loan.
20.

Glover received only a form Promissory Note signed by

Ennenga, there was no security for the Note, and Ennenga did not
provide Glover any information regarding Ennenga's ability to repay
the Note.
21.

Ennenga did not advise GJLover to consult with independent

counsel regarding the transaction, and Glover did not consent in
writing to the loan arrangement with Ennenga.
22.

Ennenga failed to timely repay the loan.

T>\\
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Glover filed suit against Ennenga seeking payment,

obtained a Default Judgment against him on March

and

7, 1989, which

Ennenga did not pay.
24

-

to attemp j
25.

Glover retained the services

-

r Raymond

Farrell

-:•>*/

The attorney who represented

which

the Judgment

Gl over

t: .hat : Ei n i

was obtained

c

,ovei

:

n +-^<* lawsuit

in

explained

to

Mar r>
ri;j.--

}

Complaint with

the

--• -'t- -

••

> •* -: - - • - •"

Conduct•
Glover

filed

an

informal

OPC

on

" *!

The OPC sent Ennenga requests for information in response
• . Wilson's Complaint, Yarbil's Complaint and Glover's Complaint.
'" .

i

t,i' t. ime.lv i"T.':-spend t

w , ; n equests tot:

information

from the OPC.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Th :i s Cu»u r f: has a I rcad^ entered Summary Judgment aqa i nst

the defendant on Counts 8 and 13 of the First Amended Complaint and
concludes that respondent violated Rule R.L(b) of the Rules of
Profess:! ona ] Condi ic t, am: :i< :i :i i: i said Summary Judgment t.he Colli: t finds
that respondent violated Rules 1.15, 8.4(b)(c), 1.4 and 8.1 with
respect to the foregoing Findings of Fact.
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The Court finds that the statute of limitations bars the

OPC Complaint against Ennenga on the Glover matter.
Counsel are to contact the Court and arrange a sanctions
hearing pursuant to Rule 11(f) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability.
Dated this

(o day of January, 2000.

x9^^fr<7
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD'
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mail ed a true and correct ,."opy >i the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this
J a i ii ia:c y

day of

2 0 00:

Kate A. Toomey
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professiona 1 Conduct
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Respondent
5790 Harrison Blvd.
Ogden, Utah
84403

w

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAl/DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Discipline :
of:
:
PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 970905496

:

Respondent.
:

This matter was tried on January 11, 2000, after which the
Court took the matter under advisement.

Prior to trial, Summary

Judgment had been entered against respondent on Counts 8 and 13 of
the

First Amended

Complaint, concluding

that respondent had

violated Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
January

18, 2000,

the

Court

entered

Findings

of

Fact

On
and

Conclusions of Law, concluding that the respondent violated Rule
1.15, Safekeeping Property; 8.4(b), Committing a Criminal Act that
Reflects Adversely on the Lawyerfs Honesty; 8.4(c), Engaging in
Conduct Involving Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit or Misrepresentation;
1.4, Failing to Communicate with Client; and 8.1, additional
conclusions of respondent's Failure to Provide Information to the
Office of Professional Conduct.

Following the Findings and

Conclusions and after a waiver with respect to the time for a
sanctions hearing, a hearing was held on March 28, 2000 regarding
the issue of sanctions. The Court took the matter under advisement

ENNENGA M A T T E R
and

now
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Issues

this Memorandum

MEMORANDUM

Decision w i t h

respect

DECISION
to

said

sancti 01 is
Pursuant

to

\ nl' thc-t Standards

Rule

for

Imposing 1

Lawy ci

S a n c t i o n s , g e n e r a l l y t h e following factors should b e c o n s i d e r e d :
a.

;
a w y e r f s m e n t a l state;

1
"i"

The? p o t e n t i a l or actual injury caused by the

miscondniM

lawyer's

itui
"T'IK'*

e x i s t e n c e of aggravating or m i t i g a t i n g factors*

T h e specific d u t i e s v i o l a t e d by M r . E n n e n g a w i t h respect t:
8 1! wer e

:i i i thr ee

separ ate

i nstances

h=

f'ai 1 ed

^

information to the O P C t h r o u g h the normal d i s c o v e r y p r o c e s s i. tr.:case,

The duty that h e violated w i t h r e s p e c t -:: ~<u;e

f a i J i 111j 1 o ( ".imintJr111,tcif ii• w i I-11 \

5

1 K M 1 1 11,JJ i n e \ \

p a r t i a l r e t a i n e r of $7 50 and filing a Complaint, Mr

Ennenga *-.Led

c o n t i n u e to w o r k on the matter and failed t o inform M r
!: hri t

|" a,cl

*tc i n

Yarb:

Mi t:l i r e s p t -

Ennenga collected t h e sum of $18,000 for his client, M s . Wilson, i-.
M a y of 1992.

M s . W i l s o n requested that Mr

i ii terest-bearing

tr us t

ctr< .omit

bt»i iause

Ennenga hold it i*- Mis
she

w as

goi it KJ

through

several important c h a n g e s in her life and felt that t h e m o n e y would
be b e t t e r k e p t by her attorney.
money

M r . E n n e n g a never d e p o s i t e d t h e

into ?» *-r^«+- account, but instead d e p o s i t e d p a r t

i iI his
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personal checking account and had part converted into a cashierfs
check, all of which he took and used for himself. At least part of
the money was used to prevent Mr. Ennenga1s family home from being
foreclosed for failure to make mortgage payments.
The reason that Mr. Ennenga misappropriated Ms. Wilsonfs money
was that he had a history of poor business practices in connection
with his law practice which resulted in his personal financial
situation being such that he could not make his mortgage payments
when due. This objective financial situation was coupled with Mr.
Ennengafs subjective inability to inform his wife and children that
he was not meeting his financial obligations.

Mr. Ennenga knew

that Ms. Wilson was not going to require immediate payment of her
funds to her, and he stalled her when she started requesting the
funds by avoiding discussion of the fund's whereabouts or the
specific time that he would remit them to her.

Mr. Ennenga

testified that he didnft want to lie to Ms. Wilson, but he didn't
want to admit that he had taken the funds and no longer had them
either. He further testified that he had many thousands of dollars
outstanding in the form of accounts receivable and from the time
that he took the $18,000 he believed he would be able to replace it
with interest and pay Ms. Wilson her funds when she required them.
Of course, this was not the case and he only repaid her in 1997
after her informal complaint against him was filed in 1996 and she
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had also retained an attorney to take action against Mr. Ennenga
for the money.
Var In 1 .1 i I in " ' pr,t i f y

Mi

'

result of Mr. Ennenga f s

show that he suffered an injury
misconduct.

r
»i rlenri> w.i"
,i pr esented 1:o

M , Ennenga paid Ms. Wilson the sum of $30,000 in 1997
i 11 I i r i i i! t e i e s 1 1 1 ) d

it t, < > r m • y • • i t

He

•• , 1111 I w 1ii • •

she testified, she did not claim any further injury.
Rule 4 : the Standards
.

; Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states
',•.-'

application

c:i ire

"

factors set forth above from Rule

sanctions are generally appropriate as follows: when
itiiujiageif.

m in p i o f e s s i O J M II m i M 'HIIHJIII t

(e) or i\)t

>i s. d e f :i i led

v:

thi
a lawyer

:i i: I Rii ::i ] € )\ , i (»n |

(<J !

Mr

Ennenga 1 s

W i l s o n ^ funds clearly falls

m l * Rule

disbarment : the presumptive sanction,

misappropriation
M '1(a),

-r

,. .
- inten! I benefit him.1.;el 1 ., Send

He tii.:Led

also falls within Rule 4 2(b), because the misappropriation of
funds was serious criminal conduct and involved misrepresentation
I'l

M.I

Will I "' I Ml II

violations

fall

HI 1 IIII I

III 1 -SdlJJifJ I U|J I J ri t(l I I I I II

either

under

Rule

III

III1 I

(ill

4.3 nr '1,4

"I'llK

)thii:!l

• Mr. Ennenga

knowingly engaged in the misconduct and caused potential Injury to
the lega] system,, and ii iterfered

M I tl :i t h e pendi i lg d isc i p 1 Inary

action against him.

' -i

ENNENGA MATTER

PAGE 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Unbeknownst to the OPC, Mr. Ennenga had received two prior
reprimands which he acknowledged at trial.

Said reprimands were

for failure to do timely filings in the late 1980 f s that did not
involve money.
The presumptive

sanction

under Rule

4.2

for

respondents

misappropriation of Ms. Wilson f s money is disbarment.
The next step in the analysis of the appropriate sanction is
consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set
forth in Rule 6.

In In re: Babilis, 951 P.2d 215, the Supreme

Court explained that, "To justify departure from the presumptive
level of discipline set forth in the standards the aggravating and
mitigating factors must be significant."
Rule 6.2 provides that aggravating circumstances may include:
(a)

Prior record of discipline.

There was prior discipline,

but not of the same nature as the Wilson misconduct.
(b)

Dishonest or selfish motive. Mr. Ennenga 1 s act was to

benefit himself and his family.
(c)

A pattern of misconduct.

The Court does not find a

pattern of misconduct in this matter, excepting his reluctance to
participate in the disciplinary process against him.
(d)

Multiple offenses.

While consideration of the rules

violated would seem to indicate multiple offenses, it is the trial

•an
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court's perspective that there were minor offenses and one stand
alone serious offense, namely, the Wilson matter.
(e)

Obstruction

intentional] y

failing

of

the

*

iiply11

disciplinary authority
(f)

*.

disciplinar\

oroceedinc

bv

Ennenga admits this.

Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other

deceptive practices during the disciplinary process.

Thi s has

apparently not occurred.
( j)

Refusal

to

acknowledge

the

wrongful

nature

of

the

misconduct

avolved, either to the client or to the disciplinary

authority.

H. , Ennenga has admitted the wrongful nature of the

ii :i s c o r •

•

lb :i s i nvolvement complete! y, and expresses

sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the misconduct took
place.

He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until

w h o r l " I ") '
" 1 »et"Of e

(h)

t.lir->

t r I it I

Vulnerability

victim

Neither Mr. Yarb

Wilson were particularly vulnerable
nt i. !i(i:i;iiin1linri
(i)

t ini

Mr

Wilson, in fact, made the

fuisy

Substantial experience

I n the practice of

Ennenga has practiced law ;.c • some 30 years, but
years t
(U

I l,i- ij.il i uf f)
Lack

*s.

-

r

law.

Mr.

was only 21

-.. o. -.riatjcui .;»!; J **3 .

of good faith effort

to make restitution or to

rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved.

Mr. Ennenga
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has made full restitution, but did not do so until he was under
duress.
(k)

Illegal

substances.

conduct,

including

the

use

of

controlled

The only illegal conduct that occurred here was the

misappropriation of funds.
The mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 6.3

are as

follows:
(a)

Absence of a prior record of discipline.

As

stated

above, there is a prior record of discipline, but less significant
than 8.4 and not of the same sort of misconduct.
(b)

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive.

Not the case

(c)

Personal

Ennenga

here.

suffering personal

or
and

emotional

problems.

emotional problems

Mr.

as a result

was

of his

inability to meet his regular financial obligations.
(d)

Timely

good

faith

effort

to make

restitution

or

to

rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga 1 s
effort was not particularly timely, but he did completely rectify
the consequences to Ms. Wilson.
(e)

Full

and

free

disclosure

to

the

client

or

the

disciplinary authority prior to the discovery of any misconduct, or
cooperative attitude toward proceedings.

This did not occur.
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(f)

Inexperience in the practice «** ^ e ]?.w

(g)

Good character or reputation

standing and t:w c c] i ents

:)f I I:i :

*.

attorneys
J

Enn<

Not applicable.
in good
J

'

il they

believed despite the facts of the i nstant case, that Mr. Ennenga
was a fine attorney with an outstanding reputation for honesty.
(h)

Phy si call d i sabi 2 ii ty

(iI

M e n t a l disability or impairment.

(j)

Unreasonable

Nc • !
::: appl ii cab] e.

delay

in

the

Not applicable.

disciplinary

proceedings

the d e l a y and provided further that t h e r e s p o n d e n t h a s demonstrated
p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t i n g from t h e delay.
Wh i 1e

M'.i

T h e r e w a s a significant delay

-•

t

I i 11»

IM-.'I

C<

unipJI a i nit,

against t h e respondent u n t i l 1996 c* ner complaints w i t h respect to
other m a t t e r s r e f e r r e d t o above were filed in 1 9 9 3 .
been cuiiihit "1 i mj ,in i nvfs 1, • 'i'*1 i on ::i i l tc
only filed its Complaint
Complaint

tlii s ma

ai id

August of 199 7, and its First Amended

In September

facilitate mov inrj tine v

The OPC has

M r . Ennenga certainly
.*

didn't

un a taster t raci^ ill liii;. iielusaill

to p r o v i d e information to t h e Bar t h r o u g h t h e d i s c o v e r y p r o c e s s ,
but t h e delay is attributable as much o r m o r e t o t h e O P C as i t is
to M r . Ennenga.

M r . Ennenga

r e s u l t i n g from t h e delay.

h a s n o t demonstrated

prejudi< :c
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Mr. Ennenga has not had any valid

complaints filed against him regarding misconduct after 1992.
(1)

Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. The Court is

aware of no other penalties or sanctions Mr. Ennenga has suffered.
(m)

Remorse. As stated above, Mr. Ennenga is very remorseful

and has been since the 1992 misconduct.
(n)

Remoteness of prior offenses.

Prior offenses are not

particularly significant, but are also not particularly remote in
time.
The

mitigating

circumstances

outweigh

the

aggravating

circumstances. In considering appropriate sanctions, the Court ha
reviewed the Tanner, 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 960 P.2d 399 (1998,
Utah Lexis 40); Stubbs, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 974 P.2d 296 (1999,
Utah Lexis 20); Babilis, 332 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 951 P.2d 207 (1997,
Utah Lexis 108); and Ince, 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 957 P.2d 1233
(1998, Utah Lexis 17), matters, wherein trial courts recommended
sanctions less than disbarment and the Supreme Court held that
disbarment was appropriate. Weighing the misconduct of Mr. Ennenga
against the misconduct of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a
significant difference in the seriousness of the conduct, both as
to the number of incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the
time elapsed between misconduct and sanction.

V I ?>
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Ennenga makes an ex post fact 3 argument analogizing to

crimina ] puni shment.
and not persuasive

The Court finds that I s contrary to case law
These cases involved prolonged activi t i e s ant II

repeated instances of serious misconduct.
Mi finnenqa shou ! mi be suspended from the practice of law fs*>
a period of six months, and when he ::i s readmitted to practice
a period not less than three years, he should have the supervision
::: £ i n i exper :1 ence< I attorney

-nd he should also participate -

psychological or psychiatri c counseling prior to practic
again.
Dated

t h :

" li.iy

«f»f

Apii 1,

'Minn.

.

. . . . ..• ....

S^Mtrf
STEPHEN L. H E N R I O D V ^ ^ ^
DISTRICT COURT JUD<3E, * ^-^f

$
/
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this
April, 2000:

Kate A. Toomey
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Respondent
5790 Harrison Blvd.
Ogden, Utah
84403

7

day of

Kate A. Toomey, #6446
Assistant Counsel
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 I I I
(801)531-9110
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND
)

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

)
)

PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999

)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

Civil No. 970905496

)

Respondent.
This matter was trie
under advisement.

)

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

January 11, 2000, after which the Court took the matter

Prior ^ trial, Summary Judgment had been entered against

respondent on Counts 8 and 13 of the First Amended Complaint, concluding that
respondent had violated Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. On January
18, 2000, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, concluding that
the respondent violated

RIIIP

1 15 Safekeeping Property, H 4(b), Committiruj a Criminal

Act that Reflects Adversely on the Lawyer's Honesty; 8.4(c), Engaging in Conduct
liivulvinq I ir,linntu;lv I

MIHI, I V U M I

in MiMepresentrUmn, 1 4, I iilnn] In i ominiiiiu al

with Client; and 8.1, additional conclusions of respondent's Failure to Provide
Information to the Office of Professional Conduct.

Following the Findings and

Conclusions and after a waiver with respect to the time for a sanctions hearing, a

3i

hearing was held on March 28, 2000 regarding the issue of sanctions. The Court took
the matter under advisement and hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:
Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, generally
the following factors should be considered:
a.

The duty violated;

b.

The lawyer's mental state;

. c.
d.

The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and
The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

The specific duties violated by Mr. Ennenga with respect to 8.1 were in three
separate instances he failed to provide information to the OPC through the normal
discovery process in this case. The duty that he violated with respect to Rule 1.4 was in
failing to communicate with a client named Yarbil. After taking a partial retainer of $750
and filing a Complaint, Mr. Ennenga failed to continue to work on the matter and failed
to inform Mr. Yarbil of that fact. With respect to Rules 1.15, 8.4(b) and 8.4(c), Mr.
Ennenga collected the sum of $18,000 for his client, Ms. Wilson, in May of 1992. Ms.
Wilson requested that Mr. Ennenga hold it in his interest-bearing trust account because
she was going through several important changes in her life and felt that the money
would be better kept by her attorney. Mr. Ennenga never deposited the money into a
trust account, but instead deposited part in his personal checking account and had part
converted into a cashier's check, all of which he took and used for himself. At least part

2

7rn

of the m,one\ was, used to prev«?n1 "l"1 Ii i: nnenqa's family home from being foreclosed for
failure to make mortgage payments.
The leason thai Mi i- nnciKjii misapfiiofjnatedl Ms Wilson's iiioirit >\ was, lh.it In1
had a history of poor t)usiness practices in connection with his law practice which
resulted in his personal financial situation being such that he c^n
mortgage payments when due. This objective financial situation was coupled with Mr.
Ennenga's subjective inability to inform his wife and children that he was not meeting
hr t>nann;tf nhlirjnlinru

M> Fnnenga ki lew that Ms. Wilson was not going to require

immediate payment of her funds to her, and he stalled her when she started requesting

would remit them to her. Mr. Ennenga testified that he didn't want to lie to Ms. Wilson,
b» it he didn't want to admit that he had taken llho lands and no lonijei Iliad them eithei
He further testified that he had many thousands of dollars outstanding in the form of
accounts receivable and from the time that he took the $18,000 he believed he would
be able to replace it with interest and pay Ms. Wilson Iler funds when she required
them. Of course, this was not the case and he only repaid her in 1997 after her informal
i omplamt aijaiiiist him was filed in H9(:i and rJn had also retained .in attorney to take
action against Mr. Ennenga for the money.
Mi i iirhil did no! testify and no ewdenne was pnnsenled I show that he sutteren
an injury as a result of Mr. Ennenga's misconduct. Mr. Ennenga paid Ms. Wilson the

sum of $30,000 in 1997 covering her principal, plus interest and attorney's fees, and
when she testified, she did not claim any further injury.
Rule 4 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states that absent
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set forth above
from Rule 3, that sanctions are generally appropriate as follows: when a lawyer
engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e) or (f), disbarment
is the presumptive sanction.

Mr. Ennenga's misappropriation of Ms. Wilson's funds

clearly falls into Rule 8.4(a). He acted with the intent to benefit himself. Said conduct
also falls within Rule 4.2(b), because the misappropriation of funds was serious criminal
conduct and involved misrepresentation to Ms. Wilson and misappropriation of her
funds. The other violations fall either under Rule 4.3 or 4.4. Mr. Ennenga knowingly
engaged in the misconduct and caused potential injury to the legal system, and
interfered with the pending disciplinary action against him.
Unbeknownst to the OPC, Mr. Ennenga had received two prior reprimands which
he acknowledged at trial. Said reprimands were for failure to do timely filings in the late
1980's that did not involve money.
The presumptive sanction under Rule 4.2 for respondent's misappropriation of
Ms. Wilson's money is disbarment.
The next step in the analysis of the appropriate sanction is consideration of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 6. In In re: Babilis, 951 P.2d
215, the Supreme Court explained that, "To justify departure from the presumptive level

4

aiQ

of discipline set forth in the standards the aggravating and mitigating factors must be
significant."
Rule 6.2 provides that aggravating circumstances may include:
(a) Prior record of discipline. There was prior discipline, but not of the same
nature as the Wilson misconduct.
(b) Dishonest or selfish motive. Mr. Ennenga's act was to benefit himself and
his family.
(c) A pattern of misconduct. The Court does not find a pattern of misconduct in
this matter, excepting his reluctance to participate in the disciplinary process against
him.
(d)

Multiple offenses. While consideration of the rules violated would seem to

indicate multiple offenses, it is the trial court's perspective that there were minor
offenses and one stand-alone serious offense, namely, the Wilson matter.
(e)

Obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply

with the rules or orders of the disciplinary authority. Mr. Ennenga admits this.
(f)

Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive

practices during the disciplinary process. This has apparently not occurred.
(g)

Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved,

either to the client or to the disciplinary authority.

Mr. Ennenga has admitted the

wrongful nature of the misconduct, has explained his involvement completely, and
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expresses sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the misconduct took place.
He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until shortly before the trial.
(h)

Vulnerability of victim. Neither Mr. Yarbil nor Ms. Wilson were particularly

vulnerable. Ms. Wilson, in fact, made the misconduct too easy.
(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law. Mr. Ennenga has practiced

law for some 30 years, but it was only 21 years to the date of the misappropriation of
funds.
0)

Lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences

of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga has made full restitution, but did not do so
until he was under duress.
(k)

Illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances.

The only

illegal conduct that occurred here was the misappropriation of funds.
The mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 6.3 are as follows:
(a)

Absence of a prior record of discipline. As stated, above, there is a prior

record of discipline, but less significant that 8.4 and not of the same sort of misconduct.
(b)

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. Not the case here.

(c)

Personal or emotional problems. Mr. Ennenga was suffering personal and

emotional problems as a result of his inability to meet his regular financial obligations.
(d)

Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences

of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga's effort was not particularly timely, but he did
completely rectify the consequences to Ms. Wilson.
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(e)

Full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the

discovery of any misconduct, or cooperative attitude toward proceedings. This did not
occur.
(f)

Inexperience in the practice of the law. Not applicable.

(g)

Good character or reputation. Two attorneys in good standing and two

clients of Mr. Ennenga's testified that they believed despite the facts of the instant case,
that Mr. Ennenga was a fine attorney with an outstanding reputation for honesty.
(h)

Physical disability. Not applicable.

(i)

Mental disability or impairment. Not applicable.

(j)

Unreasonable delay in the disciplinary proceedings provided that the

respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that the
respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay.

There was a

significant delay in this matter. While Ms. Wilson did not file her complaint against the
respondent until 1996, other complaints with respect to other matters referred to above
were filed in 1993. The OPC has been conducting an investigation into this matter
since 1993, and only filed its Complaint in August of 1997, and its First Amended
Complaint in September of 1997. Mr. Ennenga certainly didn't facilitate moving the
case forward on a faster track in his refusal to "provide information to the Bar through the
discovery process, but the delay is attributable as much or more to the OPC as it is to
Mr. Ennenga. Mr. Ennenga has not demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay.
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(k)

Interim reform.

Mr. Ennenga has not had any valid complaints filed

against him regarding misconduct after 1992.
(I)

Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. The Court is aware of no other

penalties or sanctions Mr. Ennenga has suffered.
(m)

Remorse. As stated above, Mr. Ennenga is very remorseful and has been

since the 1992 misconduct.
(n)

Remoteness of prior offenses.

Prior offenses are not particularly

significant, but are also not particularly remote in time.
The mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances.

In

considering appropriate sanctions, the Court has reviewed the Tanner, 346 Utah Adv.
Rep. 20, 960 P.2d 399 (1998, Utah Lexis 40); Stubbs. 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 974 P.2d
296 (1999, Utah Lexis 20); Babilis, 332 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 951 P.2d 207 (1997, Utah
Lexis 108); and Ince, 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 957 P.2d 1233 (1998, Utah Lexis 17),
matters, wherein trial courts recommended sanctions less than disbarment and the
Supreme Court held that disbarment was appropriate. Weighing the misconduct of Mr.
Ennenga against the misconduct of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a
significant difference in the seriousness of the conduct, both as to the number of
incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the time elapsed between misconduct and
sanction.
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Mr. Ennenga makes an ex post facto argument analogizing to criminal
punishment. The Court finds that is contrary to case law and not persuasive. These
cases involved prolonged activities and repeated instances of serious misconduct.
Mr. Ennenga should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months, and when he is readmitted to practice for a period not less than three years, he
should have the supervision of an experienced attorney, and he should also participate
in psychological or psychiatric counseling prior to practicing law again.
DATED this

[_ day of April,'2000.
BY THE COURT:

^==-^

/ffijo OF/,
The Honorable Stephen ^ ^ m : i o c t
District Court Judge \ ^••... ° ^ . -

AS TO FORM:

Brian R. Florence

iv

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April ^£, 2000, I caused to be mailed via United States
first-class mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to:
Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Respondent
5790 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403

M\uXb tijdlsms
z:\ennenga peter\formal\plead\findings of fact.doc
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Kate A. Toomey, #6446
Assistant Counsel
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)531-9110
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

i

ORDER: SUSPENSION

PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999

I

Civil No. 970905496

I

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Respondent.

The Court, having reviewed all pleadings and papers filed in this matter, having
conducted a sanctions hearing on March 28, 2000 for the purpose of receiving
testimony and exhibits, having heard the argument of counsel, having entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and otherwise being fully advised in the
premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, Peter M. Ennenga, is suspended
rom the practice of law for a period of six months.

It is further ordered that when Mr. Ennenga is readmitted to practice, for a period
not less than three years he shall have the supervision of an experienced attorney.
It is further ordered that Mr. Ennenga shall participate in psychological or
psychiatric counseling prior to practicing law again.
DATED this

/ _ day of 4pril/2000.
BY THE COURT:

The Honorable Stephen L. Henaqd, ^ - ^
District Court Judge
W*.,*— -ir-

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD

S'IMT'PJ

Brian R. Florence

DATE:

C0URT

'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 2&> 2000, I caused to be mailed via United States
first-class mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER:
SUSPENSION to:
Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Respondent
5790 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403

J^jiub
z:\ennenga peter\formal\plead\order.doc
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May [^""2000, I caused to be mailed via United States
first-class mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER:
SUSPENSION to:
Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Respondent
5790 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403

z:\ennenga peter\formal\plead\order.doc
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this i S S - r W of October, 2000, I caused to be mailed via
United States mail, first class postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Brian R. Florence, 5790 Harrison Boulevard,
Ogden, Utah 84403.
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